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Abstract 
This paper explores the impact of Malian migrants' Home Town Associations (HTAs) located in 
France on the provision of local public goods in Mali. To this end, we compute an original dataset on 
all the HTAs that have been created by Malian migrants in France since 1981 and geo-localize their 
interventions on the Malian territory. Thanks to four waves of Malian census, we also build a panel 
dataset on the provision of a range of public goods in all Malian villages over the 1976-2009 period. 
These two sources of data allow us to implement a difference-in-differences strategy, and to compare 
villages with and without an HTA, before and after HTAs developed their activity in Mali. We find 
that Malian HTAs have significantly contributed to improve the provision of schools, health centers 
and water amenities over the 1987-2009 period. When looking at the timing of the treatment, we 
observe that the difference between  treated and control villages in terms of water amenities is mainly 
driven by the second period of observation (1998-2009), while schools and health centers exhibit 
significant differences during the whole period. 
Key words: Local public goods, Migration, Mali. 
Résumé 
Nous analysons l’impact des associations de migrants (AM) de Maliens vivant en France sur la 
disponibilité en biens publics au Mali. Pour ce faire, nous avons constitué une base originale de 
données qui recense l’ensemble des AM maliennes enregistrées au Journal Officiel français depuis 
1981 et qui géo-référence leurs lieux d’intervention. Cette base est couplée avec quatre recensements 
exhaustifs qui permettent de connaître la disponibilité en biens publics de chaque village malien de 
1976 à 2009. En mettant en œuvre une estimation en double différences, nous montrons que les AM 
maliennes ont significativement contribué à l’augmentation du nombre d’écoles, de centres de santé et 
d’adduction d’eau sur la période 1987-2009. Plus précisément, on observe que la différence entre le 
groupe de villages traités et le groupe de contrôle concernant l’adduction en eau est dû à des 
investissements menés durant la seconde période (1998-2009) tandis que les financements des AM 
concernant les écoles et les centres de santé ont eu lieu tout au long de la période 1987-2009. 
Mots Clés : biens publics locaux, migration, Mali. 
JEL Code: F22, H41, H75, O55. 
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1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a growing interest of scholars, development practitioners and
international organizations for the relationship between migration and development. In
particular, academic research has strongly focused on the impact of remittances on origin
countries, notably on aggregate development outcomes such as poverty and growth and on
recipient households’ behavior. External remittances have become indeed an increasingly
substantial source of financial flows for developing countries, and have outstripped private
capital flows and official development aid in many of them. In 2011, remittances were the
second largest source of external finance to developing countries as a whole (370 billion
dollars) behind foreign direct investment (around 500 billion dollars). They were nearly
three times larger than official development assistance (around 140 billion dollars) (Ratha
and Silwal (2012)).
In addition to sending remittances to their family, migrants frequently contribute to
the development of their village of origin by sending collective transfers through Home
Town Associations (HTAs). HTAs are voluntary clubs located in immigrants’ host soci-
eties made up of migrants from the same locality of origin. Their aim is to fund local
development projects, and as such they received an increased attention from the devel-
opment community which considers them as potential actors in the process of leveraging
funds for investment and development in resource-poor communities of origin. There are
indeed good reasons to be optimistic about the role of HTAs in development. In a context
of weak states with low fiscal capacity, HTAs and collective remittances may complement
scarce public resources and relieve binding budget constraints. Thus, the population of
the locality of origin where the HTAs intervene may end up better off.
Yet, the question of HTAs’ real impact on local development is not that straightfor-
ward. First, collective remittances may crowd out public finance. Indeed, by relaxing
important bottlenecks, they may create a disincentive for the state and local governments
to intervene and result in lower public spending (Grabel (2008)). In other words, HTAs
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activity may allow local governments to extricate themselves from their traditional re-
sponsibilities, leaving the targeted localities worse off in terms of public goods. Second,
HTAs may not be as effective as public actors in terms of development objectives. Indeed,
the impact of HTAs’ activity depends on how projects are conceived and selected and on
how transparent and inclusive are decision-making processes. When projects are designed
by HTAs’ members from abroad with little or no input from their potential beneficiaries,
they may be ill-conceived, may not meet the needs of home communities, and may thus
be quickly abandoned. Third, when the migration process is selective and mainly involves
certain groups, HTAs’ projects may serve private agendas rather than addressing larger
community needs. Their benefits may thus be narrowly distributed and aggravate social
cleavages in the community. In this scenario, HTAs may contribute to erode social co-
hesion within the local communities, thereby altering their capacity to agree upon and
implement collective action, which ultimately has detrimental effects on sustained local
development.
In the case of Mali, a few small-scale case studies focusing on the Kayes area, in the
Western part of the country, describe migrants’ HTAs as a substantial source of fund-
ing and document the number and type of development projects they have financed.1
However, the contribution of HTAs at the national level has never been systematically
investigated, and there is no quantitative evidence on whether their activity makes the
villages of origin better off in terms of local public goods than the villages with no HTA.
This lack of evidence on the net impact of HTAs on local development is not restricted
to Mali, and the literature provides very little quantitative evidence on collective remit-
tances.2 One major exception is the work of Beauchemin and Schoumaker (2009) on
1The pioneering research on this topic has been written in the 1990s, see for instance Quiminal (1991)
and Daum (1998). Gauvrit and Le Bahers (2004) make an inventory of development projects financed
by HTAs in 51 Malian localities in the Kayes region, whereas Charef and Gonin (2005) undertake several
case studies at the locality level, all of them in the Kayes region.
2In the case of Mexico, the literature provides some insights on collective remittances through the
analysis of a specific program called Tres por Uno (3x1). This program consists in supporting HTAs’
activity in the development of origin communities by providing complementary funding through munic-
ipal, state and federal contributions. Aparicio and Meseguer (2012) find for e.g. that high-migration
municipalities are more likely to participate to the program, but that, at similar levels of migration,
poorer localities tend to benefit less from it. They also find a political bias in the allocation of public
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Burkina Faso. The authors exploit retrospective data covering the 1960-2002 period on a
sample of 600 settlements and use event-history models to test whether the existence of a
migrant association3 has an influence on the provision of public services, on agricultural
modernization and on the availability of infrastructures. They find a positive and signif-
icant effect of HTAs on the provision of social services and roads, with some differences
in magnitude from one decade to the other.
Strong data limitations explain this lack of quantitative assessment. The first phase of
this research thus started with a long data collection process. We computed an original
dataset that provides an exhaustive list of the HTAs created by Malian migrants in
France. For each HTA, we have been able to find its date of creation, as well as the
name of the locality where it intervenes in Mali. Thanks to the four waves of census
(Recensement Ge´ne´ral de la Population et de l’Habitat) conducted by the Malian Office
of statistics for the years 1976, 1987, 1998 and 2009, we then built a panel dataset of
all Malian villages and their stock of infrastructures at those four dates. Retrospective
and exhaustive data on local public goods over such a long period are rare in Africa.
We then combined our two datasets in order to compare the provision of public goods
before and after the intervention of HTAs in villages with and without an HTA, through
a difference-in-differences approach. Overall, we find that villages targeted by an HTA
are better off in terms of public good provision. The impact varies depending on the type
of public good and on the timing of the treatment. We then test the robustness of our
results against the possibility of an endogenous selection into the treatment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the emergence
and development of HTAs in Mali. The data and descriptive statistics are presented
in Section 3. Section 4 describes our empirical strategy and provides benchmark re-
sults together with evidence that supports the parallel trend assumption underlying our
difference-in-differences approach. In Section 5, we investigate potential selection issues
goods financed by the 3x1 Program.
3Contrary to other West African countries such as Mali, most Burkinabe´ HTAs have been created by
domestic migrants.
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which may bias our benchmark results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The emergence and development of Malian mi-
grants’ HTAs
Mali has a long-lasting history of migration, both within West Africa and with the rest of
the world. Coˆte d’Ivoire is the main country of destination of Malian migrants, whereas
France represents the most important destination among migrants who leave the African
continent: in 2011, about 39% Malian migrants were living in Coˆte d’Ivoire, 35% in other
African countries, 16% in France and 10% in the rest of the word.4
While the tradition of migration among the Malian population goes back to the pre-
colonial period, the presence of the first Malian migrants in France is generally attributed
to the considerable growth in sea-borne trade between West Africa and Europe prior to
the First World War which led some Malians employed in the French merchant marine to
settle in French harbor cities before moving to other places including Paris (Manchuelle
(1997)). However, the bulk of migration from Mali to France occurred during the 1960s
and 1970s. At that period, migration flows were mainly composed of individuals coming
from the Kayes area, located in the Western part of the country, and belonging to the
Soninke ethnic group. While migration to France has evolved and now includes individ-
uals from other regions and ethnic backgrounds, the Kayes area remains the main region
of origin of Malian migrants: 25% of the migrants who have settled abroad, and more
than a half of those living in France, originate from this region.
The rapid growth of the Malian community in France since 1960 has translated into
increasing flows of remittances directly sent by the migrants to their families. It has
also resulted in the spontaneous emergence and development of Home-Town Associations
(HTAs) constituted of migrants originating from the same community in Mali.5
4Figure computed by the authors using data from the EMOP Enquete Modulaire et permanente aupre`s
des Me´nages representative survey, INSTAT Mali, 2011.
5The creation of HTAs is not exclusively undertaken by Malian migrants in France. According to the
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As underlined by the anthropological literature (see, e.g., Quiminal (1991), Daum
(1995)), the earlier HTAs, the so-called “Caisses villageoises” were created for the specific
purpose of helping their fellow migrants with any financial problem they might encounter
in the host country. They were thus primarily concerned with settlement in France. It
is only in the 1980s that HTAs started expanding their scope of operations to address
concerns not only in the country of destination but also in Mali. While their actions
were initially confined to prestigious projects such as the construction of mosques, they
gradually covered every aspect of daily life in the villages with development projects
ranging from hydraulics to healthcare and from basic education to cultural exchanges.
French public policies did play a role in this trajectory as foreigners were not allowed
to gather in associations, and gained this right when a left-wingist government came to
power in 1981. This allowed HTAs to be officially registered in France, a prerequisite to
collect membership fees and organize fundraising. According to Daum (1998), 95% of all
the HTAs which were existing in 1992 were officially registered.
Collecting reliable data on associations is an exceedingly difficult task in most immi-
gration countries considering the small size and informality of most HTAs. In the case
of France, however, the fact that most HTAs are officially registered has facilitated the
data collection process (see Section 3 below). According to Daum (1998), there were 143
Malian HTAs registered in France in 1992, a number that had increased up to 421 by
2009 according to our own estimates (Bernard et al. (2013)).
2012 edition of the EMOP survey, 61% of the HTAs recorded in the sample villages have been created
by migrants living in countries other than France, Their distribution by region reflects international
migration patterns: they are indeed much less concentrated in the Kayes region than HTAs hosted in
France: only 21% intervene in this region against respectively 27% and 26% in the regions of Mopti and
Koulikoro. Many HTAs have also been created by internal migrants. The EMOP survey enumerated
no less than 526 such HTAs in its 2012 edition. Internal HTAs and HTAs located in other destination
countries have lower resources and financial leverage than those hosted in France, which justifies our
focus on the latter.
6
3 Data
We mobilize two sources of data to explore the link between migrants’ HTAs and the
provision of local public goods in the Malian villages over the 1987-2009 period. The first
one is an original and exhaustive census of the Malian HTAs in France. The second is
a panel of Malian villages that we compute using the 1976, 1987, 1998 and 2009 Malian
Population Censuses (Recensement Ge´ne´ral de la Population et de l’Habitat, INSTAT).
3.1 Home Town Associations
We collected an exhaustive original dataset on Malian migrants’ HTAs in France. Iden-
tifying migrants’ associations is generally tricky, as any non-profit association created in
France (also called Association Loi 1901 ) can operate without being registered. However,
registration becomes a prerequisite if a bank account is needed or if the association aims
at collecting membership fees or arranging fundraising. Registration is made at the Pre´-
fecture or Sous-Pre´fecture of the district where the association is located. This simple
registration procedure is followed by a declaration of the association’s creation in the
French Official Journal (Journal Officiel), a daily paper edited by the French government
containing legal information, official notifications and detailed information concerning
new associations, in particular their name and object.
Foreigners gained the right to gather in associations in France when the Socialist Party
came to power in 1981. It took a few years, however, before the first Malian migrants’
HTAs started declaring themselves. Before 1987 indeed, which constitutes the “baseline”
year in our empirical analysis, only 13 HTAs had registered, 10 of them operating in
the Kayes region. Of course, it is likely that some HTAs were functioning before 1981
without being registered. If this were true, this could bias our results by contaminating
the control group. However, this bias is likely to be negligible as HTAs created in the
1970s and early 1980s were not actively involved in the development of the villages of
origin.
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We used the archives of the French Journal Officiel to seek all the Malian HTAs
declared in France. Concretely, we extracted from the Journal all the associations con-
taining, in their name or declared purpose, either the word “Mali” or any of its derivatives
in French, or the name of one of the 10,000 villages of Mali. The methodology of this
data collection is further detailed in Bernard et al. (2013). We ended up with 421 Malian
HTAs declared between 1981 and 2009 which aim is to channel funds for the development
of small-scale areas (either villages or communes). We excluded from our census all the
HTAs targeting entire regions (or even Mali as a whole), for not being able to precisely
identify where they intervene.
Table 1 presents the distribution of the 421 HTAs created over the 1987-2009 period,
by region. Column (1) provides totals, while columns (2), (3) and (4) provide sub-totals
after disaggregating the sample according to the date of registration of each HTA.
Table 1: Number of Malian HTAs registered in France
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Before 1987 1987-1998 1998-2009
Mali 421 13 116 292
Kayes 310 10 89 211
Koulikoro 44 1 11 32
Sikasso 10 0 2 8
Se´gou 6 1 1 4
Mopti 41 0 11 30
Tombouctou 3 0 1 2
Gao 4 1 0 3
Kidal 3 0 1 2
The spatial distribution of HTAs clearly confirms the role of the Kayes area as the
main source of Malian migrants to France: 73.5% of the Malian HTAs created in France
before 2009 target a locality in Kayes. The remainder mainly concentrates on Koulikoro
(10.5%) and Mopti (9.5%). Then come Sikasso (2.5%) and Se´gou (1.5%). Less than 1%
of the HTAs targets each of the three remaining regions (Gao, 1%, and Tombouctou and
Kidal, 0.5% each).
As a last step, we associate to each village of Mali a dummy variable indicating
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whether this village is targeted by (at least) one HTA.6 This dummy is our treatment
variable. We consider a village as treated in two cases: first, if it is directly targeted by
a French HTA, and second, if the village is part of a commune which is targeted by a
French HTA7.
This dataset allows us to distinguish between treated localities and their control coun-
terparts, which have no HTA in France. To assess the differences between treated and
control villages in terms of local public good provision, we focus on the sample of villages
that we can track from 1987 to 2009. Indeed, the territorial composition of the country
experienced transformations over the period, in particular driven by the huge growth of
the Malian population and by internal migration patterns which led to the birth of new
villages, or conversely to the aggregation of villages. Moreover, in 1998, the insecurity in
the Northern part of the Malian territory linked to the Touareg rebellion prevented the
national office of statistics to collect data in some areas of the regions of Gao and Kidal.
These restrictions make us end up with a sample of 8,606 villages out of the 10,629
Malian villages of the census of 2009. Among those 8,606 villages, 60 are further excluded
from the analysis for being targeted by the 13 HTAs created between 1981 and 1987.
Thus, 8,546 localities will be included in the estimations. 7,381 of them belong to the
control group and 1,165 to the treated one. In the latter group, 495 had their first HTA
created before 1998, and 670 afterwards. The distribution of treated and control villages
by region is given by Table 2.
One important drawback of these data comes from the fact that we do not have much
information on HTAs’ dissolution. In theory, any change made in the association should
be published in the Journal Officiel. Declaring a dissolution, be it voluntary, legal or
administrative, is a procedure as simple as notifying a creation, but in practice it is not
compulsory and very few associations do it. When assessing the difference, in terms of
local public good provision, between villages with and without HTA, we thus estimate a
6More precisely, the geographic unit of observation is the village in rural areas and the neighborhood
in urban areas. In the rest of the paper, we will use the terms “villages” or “localities” indifferently to
refer to rural villages and to urban neighborhoods.
7In average, each commune gathers on average 15 villages.
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lower bound given that some associations observed in our data potentially do not exist
any more.
Table 2: Number of villages with and without HTA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Localities Localities with Localities with Localities with Localities
an HTA created an HTA created an HTA created without HTA
before 1987 between 1987 after 1998
and 1998
Mali 8606 60 495 670 7381
Kayes 1311 51 221 299 740
Koulikoro 1624 7 145 231 1241
Sikasso 1523 0 26 27 1470
Se´gou 1801 1 1 4 1795
Mopti 1832 0 98 63 1671
Tombouctou 395 0 4 29 362
Gao 120 1 0 17 102
Kidal 0 0 0 0 0
3.2 Local public goods
Data on the Malian villages come from the four population censuses conducted by the
Malian Office of statistics (INSTAT) in 1976, 1987, 1998 and 2009. These censuses provide
information on the number and type of public goods at the level of the villages.8 Thanks
to these data, we compute three indicators of local infrastructures for each Malian village
that are strictly comparable between the years 1976, 1987, 1998 and 2009:
• SCHOOL: Number of primary and secondary schools;
• HEALTH : Number of health centers;
• WATER: Number of public fountains.
Moreover, the 1998 and 2009 data provide disaggregated information on the type
of available health equipments. This allows us to build five more indicators of health
infrastructures for these two years:
8See footnote 6 for a more precise definition of the geographic unit of observation.
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• HOSP : Number of hospitals;
• CLINICS : Number of clinics;
• DISPENS : Number of dispensaries;
• MATER: Number of maternities;
• CSCOM : Number of community health centers9.
The Malian censuses of 1987, 1998 and 2009 also provide household-level data on
housing conditions which we rely on to build three additional variables informing the
type of access to water:
• HH TAP : Share of households in the village using a tap as source of water;
• HH WELL: Share of households in the village using a well or a drilling as source of
water;
• HH FOUNTAIN : Share of households in the village using a public fountain as
source of water.
All three measures relate to alternative water supply amenities which differ from one
another in terms of the initial investment they require and of the quality of the water they
supply. Finally, the household-level data allow us to calculate the share of households in
the village that are connected to the electrical grid, HH ELEC.
Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations of the different public good mea-
sures within the treated and control groups, and the average differences between the two
groups at each wave of the census (i.e. in 1976, 1987, 1998 and 2009). The number
of schools, water amenities and health infrastructures experienced a sustained increase
from 1976 to 2009, the pace of this increase being stronger after 1987. This is the case
both for the treated and for the control groups. Between the years 1998 and 2009, for
9The CSCOM, Centres de sante´ communautaires, are community health centers which developed from
the beginning of the nineties and centralize multiple health services in a single place. They are managed
by community associations and usually gather a dispensary, a maternity and a pharmacy.
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which we have disaggregated data on health infrastructures, the number of dispensaries
and maternities decreased in both groups while the number of CSCOM largely increased.
This trend reflects the public willingness to develop these types of health centers from
the beginning of the nineties. Turning to the alternative sources of water, the share of
households using a tap increased a lot in both groups over the period. At the same time,
the share of households using a well or a drilling remained roughly stable, while the share
of households using a fountain first increased (between 1987 and 1998) and then decreased
(between 1998 and 2009). Finally, in both groups, the share of households connected to
the electrical grid experienced a growing trend over the period that accelerated between
1998 and 2009.
Turning to the average differences between the treated and control groups, it appears
that treated villages were better endowed in terms of most public goods at the beginning of
the period, and remained better endowed, though these differences are not systematically
statistically significant. Regarding households’ access to the different water sources and
to electricity, we observe that the share of households using a tap increased between 1987
and 2009 in both groups, the treated localities starting from a slightly higher level. The
share of households using a well or a drilling remained roughly stable over the period and
within both groups. The share of households using a public fountain increased in both
groups, the control group starting with a higher proportion in 1987. Finally, the average
share of households connected to electricity, though still very low, increased substantially
in both samples (the treated group exhibiting a higher starting point).
In the rest of the paper, we will perform difference-in-differences estimations question-
ing the impact of HTAs on the provision of local public goods from 1987 to 2009, relying
on a panel data set at the level of the Malian villages over the 1976-2009 period.
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3.3 Other observable characteristics
The Malian censuses also provide individual-level data which allow us to compute the
following village-level variables:
• Population: size of the population of the locality;
• Ethno-linguistic fragmentation: one minus the Herfindahl index computed relying
on the share of each ethnic group (based on mother tongue);
• % of labor force in the primary sector : share of the active population of the village
working in the agricultural sector;
• Returnees France: share of the population of the village who has been living in
France for more than six months (available only in 1998 and 2009);
• Emigration France: share of the population of the village currently living in France,
only available in 2009.10
We also rely on the data of the Climatic Research Unit, University of East Anglia,
to compute the average annual rainfall and average rainfall shocks experienced by the
villages over the previous decade. We derive the latter variable by regressing, for each
village, the level of yearly observed rainfalls on their lagged values and on a time trend,
and by calculating the standard deviation of the predicted residuals of these estimations
over ten years.
In Table 4, we present the means and standard deviations for the different observed
characteristics of the treated and control villages, and the average differences between
these two groups at each wave of the census. Table 4 shows that treated villages are, on
average, larger than control villages, and have experienced a larger demographic growth
since 1987. Treated villages are also more ethnically fragmented than control villages,
even though the difference between the two groups has decreased since 1987. On average,
annual rainfalls are significantly lower in the treated villages than in the control villages.
10The census questionnaire only identifies migrants who left Mali less than 5 years ago.
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The volatility of rainfalls was not significantly higher in treated villages, but became
so over the last decade, 1999-2009. Finally, treated and control villages largely differ
in terms of migration intensity, as reflected by the percentage of return and current
migrants from/in France. Those descriptive statistics are in line with the fact that HTAs
are created where a sufficient number of migrants and return migrants are gathered, and
mainly in the North Western part of Mali where rainfall are lower than in the South.
4 Empirical strategy and benchmark results
In what follows, we consider the presence of one or several HTAs in a given village
as a treatment variable. We rely on a difference-in-differences approach and proceed
in three steps: we first compare changes in local public good provision between the
treated and the control villages between 1987 and 2009. As suggested by Table 2 indeed,
very few HTAs were created (and registered) before 1987. We thus exclude from our
sample the 60 villages which had an HTA before 1987, and consider the 1987 and 2009
Population censuses as our baseline and endline surveys respectively. We then investigate
the potential heterogeneity of the treatment effect across subperiods of time. Indeed, we
observe the provision of public goods in the Malian villages in 1976, 1987, 1998 and 2009.
We can match these data emanating from the four waves of the census with the dates of
HTAs’ registration in France. We estimate separately the impact of earlier HTAs (created
before 1998), both over the first and over the second decade of treatment (1987-1998 and
1998-2009), and the impact of more recent HTAs (created after 1998) over the 1998-2009
period. We finally question the identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences
approach which requires that localities with HTAs would have followed a trend in local
public good provision similar to that observed in their non-treated counterparts, had
they not had any HTA. We provide evidence on this parallel trend assumption by testing
whether treated and control villages were already experiencing different trends in terms
of public good provision before the treatment occurrence (i.e. between 1976 and 1987).
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As a first step, we estimate the following econometric model:
LPGi,t = α0 + δt + νi + α1Di,t + θj ∗ δt + i,t (1)
where LPGi,t is the level of public goods in locality i at time t, δt is a time fixed-effect,
νi is a village fixed-effect and Di,t is a dummy equal to 1 if village i has at least one HTA
during the considered period. The village fixed-effects νi capture all the time-invariant
characteristics of the villages affecting the level of public goods. θj ∗ δt are commune
dummies interacted with time dummies. These variables account for unobservable time-
variant characteristics at the level of the communes. By introducing them, we control
for other confounding factors, at the commune level, that might explain the contrasted
evolutions observed between treated and control villages over the 1987-2009 period. The
allocation of central resources to communes could be for e.g. systematically biased in
favor of (or against) migrant-prone areas and lead us to over-(or under-)estimate the
impact of the treatment. Finally, i,t is an idiosyncratic error term.
Tables 5 and 6 provide regression results of Equation 1 using as dependent variables
the provision of various types of local public goods, on different time spans. In the second
panel of each Table, we question the parallel trend assumption by investigating the pre-
treatment periods. In column (1a) we compare changes in local public good provision
between the treated and the control villages between 1987 and 2009, without introducing
the commune x time dummies. Column (1b) presents our preferred specification, where
these variables are included.
The evolution of local public good provision over the 1987-2009 period is found to be
significantly different between villages with and without an HTA. The estimated difference
is overall stronger when commune x time dummies are controlled for - with the exception
of the share of households with access to electricity. Using column (1b) of Tables 5 and 6
as benchmark, we find that on average, villages which benefit from the support of at least
one HTA tend to have more schools, public fountains and health amenities than control
17
villages. The size of the coefficients suggests that the number of public fountains has
increased by one more unit in average, and the number of schools by a bit less than one
unit more in average, in villages targeted by at least one HTA between 1987 and 2009.
Note that these results could be a lower bound estimate of the impact of HTAs as some
of the villages taken as controls might be targeted by an HTA created by either internal
migrants or migrants living in other countries than France.
The contribution of HTAs to local public good provision also seems to translate into
an increased household access to safe water through public fountains. Moreover, the
share of households using a tap as their main source of water is found to be higher in the
treated group, while the share of households using a well or a drilling is lower, suggesting
an upgrade in water supply amenities. On the other hand, no significant impact is found
regarding the percentage of households connected to electricity.
One of the most common problems with the difference-in-differences approach relies
on the impossibility to directly test the parallel trend assumption on which it relies. In our
case, a failure of this assumption would mean that our variables of interest, namely local
public good provision and household access to local public goods, would have followed a
different trend for the treated and control localities had there been no exposure to the
treatment. To investigate the parallel trend assumption, we rely on the period preceding
the treatment to test whether estimated changes in public good provision across treated
and control localities were significantly different during the pre-treatment period. Due to
lack of data on household access to water and electricity in the 1976 census, we are only
able to implement this test for the three first measures of local public good availability,
the number of schools, public fountains and health centers. Results are shown in the
second panel of Tables 5 and 6.
Whatever the specification (without commune trends in column (1a) or controlling for
commune trends in column (1b)), the changes in the number of schools are not statistically
different between treated and control villages over the 1976-1987 pre-treatment period.
In other terms, school provision in the treated and control localities followed a virtually
18
identical trend prior to the creation of the first HTAs, which increases the confidence in
the identification assumption.
The same is not true for water amenities. The results suggest diverging pre-treatment
trends in the provision of public fountains between treated and control villages, with
treated villages recording a larger increase in the number of public fountains between
1976 and 1987. However, the size of the coefficient, 0.079, is much smaller than in the
benchmark model, 1.029, which suggests that HTAs have contributed to exacerbate this
diverging trend.
Finally, the test of parallel trend assumption for health centers suggests that, if any,
the pre-treatment trend divergence was playing against the treated villages, as shown
by the significantly negative coefficient in column (1b) of Table 6. Taking this result
into account, the significantly positive coefficient of 0.267 obtained in the top of Table 6
suggests that, not only villages with an HTA are better off in terms of health amenities
than the control villages, but that HTAs compensated for pre-treatment adverse trends
in the treated villages.
Columns (2) to (4) of Tables 5 and 6 explore the timing of the treatment. Using the
panel dimension of the data, we estimate separately the impact of earlier HTAs (created
before 1998), and the impact of more recent HTAs (created after 1998). We first focus
on HTAs created in France between 1987 and 1998, and look at their impact on the
provision of local public goods in the Malian villages over the same period (column (2)),
and over the following period, 1998-2009 (column (3)). In this setting, the treated group
is composed of the 495 villages that were targeted by an HTA between 1987 and 1998
and the control group gathers the localities with no HTA over the whole period.
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Table 5: Benchmark Results - Part 1
A. Difference in differences after the treatment occurred
(1a) (1b) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment: HTA Old HTA Recent HTA
Outcome period: 1987-2009 1987-1998 1998-2009 1998-2009
SCHOOL 0.117** 0.869** 0.713*** -0.129 0.568*
(0.050) (0.346) (0.240) (0.158) (0.315)
WATER 0.294*** 1.029*** 0.427 2.177** 0.319
(0.067) (0.374) (0.300) (1.043) (0.228)
HH TAP 0.028*** 0.044*** -0.003 0.045* 0.033
(0.005) (0.016) (0.005) (0.027) (0.020)
HH WELL -0.040*** -0.076* 0.014 -0.113* -0.124***
(0.011) (0.043) (0.065) (0.059) (0.043)
HH FOUNTAIN 0.019*** 0.091*** 0.034 0.094** 0.088***
(0.005) (0.022) (0.029) (0.042) (0.033)
HH ELEC 0.006** 0.006 -0.002 0.020 -0.010*
(0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.017) (0.006)
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune-level trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,092 17,092 15,752 15,752 16,102
Nb of treated 1,165 1,165 495 495 670
Nb of controls 7,381 7,381 7,381 7,381 7,381
B. Testing the assumption of parallel trend before treatment
Outcome period: 1976-1987 1976-1987 1976-1987 1987-1998
SCHOOL 0.024 0.040 -0.057 0.090 0.317*
(0.016) (0.050) (0.067) (0.061) (0.193)
WATER 0.020** 0.079** -0.005 0.117** -0.010
(0.010) (0.034) (0.005) (0.047) (0.084)
HH TAP 0.011
(0.007)
HH WELL 0.056
(0.039)
HH FOUNTAIN -0.014
(0.021)
HH ELEC 0.009*
(0.004)
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune-level trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,092 17,092 15,752 16,102 16,102
Nb of treated 1,165 1,165 495 670 670
Nb of controls 7,381 7,381 7,381 7,381 7,381
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Each coefficient corresponds to a different estimation, the dependant variable appearing in rows.
Column (1a) presents standard double-differences, while Columns (1b), (2), (3) and (4) introduce commune-level time trends. In
all columns, the control group gathers the villages without HTA. In Columns (1a) and (1b), the treated villages are those with an
HTA (whatever its date of creation). In Columns (2) and (3), the treated group is composed of the villages with an HTA created
between 1987 and 1998, while in Column (4) the treated villages are those with an HTA created after 1998.
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Table 6: Benchmark Results - Part 2
A. Difference in differences after the treatment occurred
(1a) (1b) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment: HTA Old HTA Recent HTA
Outcome period: 1987-2009 1987-1998 1998-2009 1998-2009
HEALTH 0.040*** 0.267*** 0.783*** -0.470*** 0.021
(0.014) (0.061) (0.146) (0.145) (0.084)
HOSP 0.035 0.021
(0.033) (0.015)
CLINICS -0.032 -0.000
(0.020) (0.018)
DISPENS -0.279** -0.115**
(0.110) (0.050)
MATER -0.321*** -0.156***
(0.100) (0.060)
CSCOM 0.160** 0.249***
(0.081) (0.067)
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune-level trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,092 17,092 15,752 15,752 16,102
Nb of treated 1,165 1,165 495 495 670
Nb of controls 7,381 7,381 7,381 7,381 7,381
B. Testing the assumption of parallel trend before treatment
Outcome period: 1976-1987 1976-1987 1976-1987 1987-1998
HEALTH 0.007 -0.061* -0.138* -0.018 0.214**
(0.009) (0.037) (0.082) (0.032) (0.100)
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune-level trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,092 17,092 15,752 16,102 16,102
Nb of treated 1,165 1,165 495 495 670
Nb of controls 7,381 7,381 7,381 7,381 7,381
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Each coefficient corresponds to a different estimation, the dependant variable appearing in rows.
Column (1a) presents standard double-differences, while Columns (1b), (2), (3) and (4) introduce commune-level
time trends.
In all columns, the control group gathers the villages without HTA. In Columns (1a) and (1b), the treated villages
are those with an HTA (whatever its date of creation). In Columns (2) and (3), the treated group is composed
of the villages with an HTA created between 1987 and 1998, while in Column (4) the treated villages are those
with an HTA created after 1998.
In both columns we control for the communes trends. Tables 5 and 6 illustrate the
evolution in the actions undertaken by early HTAs. They concentrated their actions on
building schools and health amenities in the first decade (column (2)). Then, between
1998 and 2009, their actions switched and focused on water supply as reflected by the large
positive coefficient for water, but also by the positive impact on the share of households
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using a tap or a fountain as their main source of water. During the 1998-2009 period,
the impact of early HTAs on the supply of schools is no longer significant. It even
becomes negative (-0.470) for health amenities. However, this negative overall coefficient
hides contrasted trends which become apparent when health infrastructures are further
disaggregated. Indeed, during the 1998-2009 period, the development of CSCOM (centres
de sante´ communautaires) have substituted for dispensaries and maternities. This switch
has been even more pronounced in the treated villages, as illustrated by the coefficients
associated with the numbers of dispensaries, maternities and CSCOM in column (3) of
Table 6.
Finally, the results shown in the bottom part of Tables 5 and 6 support the assump-
tion that pre-treatment trends were similar across treated and control villages regarding
schools and public fountains. Regarding health centers, the divergence in pre-treatment
trends was, again, playing against the treated villages (negative coefficient).
Symmetrically, we investigate in column (4) the impact of HTAs created during the
following decade, 1998-2009, on local public good provision. In this setting, the treated
group is composed of 670 villages with an HTA created after 1998, that we compare to
the 7,381 villages with no HTA over the whole period (the control group). The 60 villages
with an HTA created before 1987, as well as the 495 villages with an HTA created between
1987 and 1998, are excluded from the sample. The double difference is implemented over
the 1998-2009 period, while we will investigate the parallel trend assumption both over
the 1976-1987 and over the 1987-1998 periods.
The results of the double difference suggest a weaker impact of recent HTAs on the
provision of public goods. The coefficient associated with recent HTAs in the equation for
the number of public fountains is no longer significant. Neither is the coefficient associated
with recent HTAs when the number of health amenities is used as the outcome variable.
However, when this outcome is disaggregated, we observe that villages with a recent HTA
have also experienced a more rapid expansion of CSCOM (at the expanse of maternities
and dispensaries) than control villages. Finally, recent HTAs seem to have had a positive
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impact on the number of schools over the 1998-2009 period, a result that should be taken
with caution given that the bottom part of the table suggests diverging pre-treatment
trends for the treated and control villages.
Overall, these results suggest that over the 1998-2009 period the action of both early
and late HTAs has been associated with an upgrade in the supply of water amenities
(increase in the share of households using public fountains as a source of water, against
the use of wells and drilling) and a switch from dispensaries and maternities to CSCOM.
This switch induces a non significant difference between treated and control villages when
we consider the aggregate number of health infrastructures. However, the placebo test
presented at the bottom of the table does not support the parallel trend assumption, cast-
ing some doubts on the results for the total number of health centers but also potentially
for the different sub-categories of health infrastructures.
The investigation of the provision of local public goods in villages targeted by HTAs
over two different subperiods suggests that the activity of HTAs has changed over time.
First focusing on schools and water amenities, they then concentrated their actions on
health infrastructures, supporting a switch from financing maternities and dispensaries
to financing CSCOM at the end of the nineties.
5 Robustness checks
In the difference-in-differences approach presented above, we control both for time-unvarying
village fixed-effects and for time-varying unobservable characteristics at the commune-
level. However, it may well be the case that time-varying village characteristics explain
both the propensity to have an HTA and the supply of public goods in the Malian villages.
In what follows, we investigate to what extent the impact of HTAs may be considered as
a causal impact or rather as reflecting specific characteristics of the treated villages.
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5.1 Controlling for observable confounding factors
As shown in Table 4, treated and control villages differ in their size, in their ethno-
linguistic fragmentation, in the share of the labor force working in the agricultural sector
and in the climatic conditions they face. They are also very different in terms of migra-
tion intensity, measured both through past migration (as suggested by the share of the
population with a past migration experience in France) and through current migration
(as suggested by the share of the population having migrated to France in the last five
years). Table 7 explores the impact of HTAs on public good provision after introducing
those additional control variables in the benchmark estimations (namely, the size of the
population in logarithm, the ethno-linguistic fragmentation, the share of the labor force
working in the primary sector, and the average rainfalls level and shock over the ten
preceding years). Overall, the results are very similar to those of Tables 5 and 6.
In column (1), we estimate the difference-in-differences in the change of public good
provision over the 1987-2009 period. At that stage, we cannot introduce the measure of
return migration intensity since it is not available in the data before 1998. The results are
virtually the same as those of column (1b) in Tables 5 and 6. The second column explores
the impact of old HTAs on the change in public good provision over the 1987-1998 period.
Migration intensity cannot be included here neither. However, controlling for the size of
the population, ethno-linguistic fragmentation, the size of the primary sector and rainfalls
leads to results which are similar in all points to those of column (2) in Tables 5 and 6. In
columns (3a) to (4b) we then explore the impact of old and recent HTAs on the provision
of public goods during the recent decade, 1998-2009, controlling or not for the share of
return migrants in the villages. Again, controlling for those covariates does not alter
our conclusions. In Annex A we present the complete results of the seven estimations
presented in column (1) of Table 711.
11The coefficients associated with the different covariates are consistent with the literature on the
determinants of local public good provision. In particular, the number of infrastructures is positively
correlated with the size of the population and negatively with ethno-linguistic fragmentation. When
performing the estimations over the recent period (1998-2009) as in columns (3b) and (4b), we can
also observe the correlations between the intensity of return migration from France and the provision of
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local public goods. The coefficient associated with return migration from France is not systematically
significant. When it is, its value is positive (results available upon request).
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Table 7: Adding time-varying covariates
(1) (2) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
Treatment: HTA Old HTA Old HTA Recent HTA
Outcome period: 1987-2009 1987-1998 1998-2009 1998-2009
SCHOOL 0.868** 0.718*** -0.112 -0.108 0.553* 0.549*
(0.344) (0.240) (0.159) (0.160) (0.315) (0.316)
WATER 1.024*** 0.432 2.174** 2.181** 0.318 0.313
(0.374) (0.301) (1.043) (1.042) (0.226) (0.225)
HH TAP 0.044*** -0.002 0.045* 0.044 0.033* 0.034*
(0.016) (0.005) (0.027) (0.027) (0.020) (0.020)
HH WELL -0.078* 0.015 -0.118** -0.118** -0.124*** -0.123***
(0.043) (0.065) (0.059) (0.059) (0.043) (0.043)
HH FOUNTAIN 0.091*** 0.034 0.094** 0.095** 0.088*** 0.087***
(0.022) (0.029) (0.042) (0.042) (0.033) (0.032)
HH ELEC 0.006 -0.002 0.021 0.021 -0.009 -0.009*
(0.008) (0.004) (0.017) (0.017) (0.006) (0.006)
HEALTH 0.267*** 0.785*** -0.463*** -0.460*** 0.018 0.017
(0.060) (0.147) (0.146) (0.145) (0.084) (0.084)
HOSP 0.035 0.035 0.021 0.021
(0.033) (0.034) (0.015) (0.015)
CLINICS -0.031 -0.031 -0.001 -0.001
(0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
DISPENS -0.278** -0.276** -0.115** -0.117**
(0.110) (0.110) (0.050) (0.050)
MATER -0.318*** -0.316*** -0.157*** -0.159***
(0.100) (0.100) (0.060) (0.060)
CSCOM 0.163** 0.162** 0.248*** 0.250***
(0.081) (0.082) (0.066) (0.066)
Time-varying covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
% Return migrants from France No No No Yes No Yes
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune-level trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,091 15,739 15,738 15,738 16,088 16,088
Nb of treated 1,165 1,165 495 495 670 670
Nb of controls 7,381 7,381 7,368 7,368 7,368 7,368
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Each coefficient corresponds to a different estimation, the dependant variable appearing in rows.
In all columns, the control group gathers the villages without HTA. In Column (1), the treated villages are those with an
HTA (whatever its date of creation). In Columns (2), (3a) and (3b), the treated group is composed of the villages with an
HTA created between 1987 and 1998, while in Column (4a) and (4b) the treated villages are those with an HTA created
after 1998.
Time-varying covariates include: population (in logarithm), index of ethnolinguistic fractionnalization, annual rainfall average
over [t, t− 1], annual rainfall shock over [t, t− 1], and share of the active population working in the primary sector.
The number of return migrants coming back from France over the total population of the village is also controlled for in
Columns (3b) and (4b).
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5.2 Selection issue
In what follows, we exploit the panel dimension of the data and the fact that some villages
have been treated since 1987, while others are only treated from 1998. This timing of
the treatment makes it possible to compare villages with an old HTA with villages with
a recent HTA. By comparing them, we thus explore the differences between two groups
which are similar in more dimensions than villages with an HTA over the whole period
and villages with no HTA at all. In particular, we assume that time-varying unobservable
characteristics, that cannot be directly controlled for, are closer between these villages
which are all to be treated at one point in time.
Moreover, as shown in Table 8, the villages benefitting from an early treatment and
those benefitting from a more recent treatment are not significantly different regarding
migration intensity.12 This point is crucial since we may suspect that the impact of
HTAs highlighted above reflects higher migration intensity rather than the action of
HTAs per se.13
In Table 9, we run difference-in-differences estimations over the 1987-1998 period,
considering the villages with an HTA registered between 1987 and 1998 as treated and
the villages targeted by an HTA after 1998 as non-treated. This strategy reduces the
potential selection-into-treatment issue. Column (1) presents the estimated differences
in terms of local public good provision between these treated and control villages over
the 1987-1998 period (i.e., when the villages with an old HTA were already treated
while the villages with a recent HTA were not treated yet). In this specification, the
number of schools and of health amenities appear to differ significantly between treated
and control villages, the treated group being better endowed. This first result suggests
that, even when comparing treated villages with soon-to-be treated villages, the treatment
is associated with a significantly larger local public good endowment.
12As well as ethnic fragmentation and rainfall shocks.
13The comparative descriptive statistics on local public good provision between villages treated by old
and recent HTAs are presented in Annex B.
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In column (2), we re-iterate the same double-difference estimation over the preceding
period, 1976-1987, as a placebo test. It appears here that the number of schools in
the treated group was already higher than in the control group before the treatment
occurred. However, the size of the two coefficients suggests that the creation of HTAs
during the following period exacerbated this already existing diverging trends in terms
of school endowment. Moreover, the estimated coefficient associated with the treatment
dummy in the health equation is not significant in column (2). Thus, while the number of
health equipments is found to be significantly larger in the treated group in column (1),
the pre-treatment trends regarding health equipments estimated in column (2) are not
significantly different between treated and control villages.
Finally, column (3) presents the same estimations as column (1) introducing our vec-
tor of time-varying control variables, to take into account observable trends that may
simultaneously affect the treatment status and the provision of local public goods. Un-
fortunately we are not able to control for migration intensity (as proxied by the share
of return migrants) since this variable is only available for 1998 and 2009. In this spec-
ification, the size and significance of the estimated coefficients are very close to those
obtained in column (1). Taken together, the results of these three columns suggest that
when we compare similar villages, which are all going to be treated at one point in time,
during the period when only part of them are treated, significant differences in terms of
local public good provision already appear, notably for the number of schools and health
infrastructures. This provides us with more confidence over the fact that our benchmark
results are not completely driven by selection issues.
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Table 9: Old vs. recent HTAs
(1) (2) (3)
Outcome period: 1987-1998 1976-1987 1987-1998
SCHOOL 0.503*** 0.214* 0.511***
(0.160) (0.111) (0.157)
WATER 0.633 -0.068 0.633
(0.593) (0.053) (0.588)
HH TAP 0.029 0.029
(0.020) (0.020)
HH WELL -0.039 -0.038
(0.041) (0.041)
HH FOUNTAIN -0.001 -0.000
(0.011) (0.011)
HH ELEC -0.003 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
HEALTH 0.640*** -0.039 0.645***
(0.182) (0.103) (0.181)
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Commune-level trends Yes Yes Yes
Time-varying covariates No No Yes
Observations 2330 2330 2330
Nb of treated 495 495 495
Nb of controls 670 670 670
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Each coefficient corresponds to a different estimation, the dependant variable ap-
pearing in rows.
The treated group gathers the villages with an HTA created between 1987 and
1998, while villages with an HTA created after 1998 compose the control group.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we question the impact of migrants HTAs registered in France on the
provision of public goods in Mali. Malian migrants in France gather in HTAs to send
collective transfers to their locality of origin and contribute to local development. Almost
one fifth of the Malian villages is targeted by HTA aiming at participating to the provision
of public goods, such as schools or health facilities. However, the impact of these HTAs
on the local development of Malian villages is not straightforward since HTAs’ activity
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may crowd out public finance, be less effective than local intervention, and affect local
governance habits.
We rely on a difference-in-differences approach to assess the differences, in terms of
local public good provision, between the Malian villages targeted by an HTA over the
1987-2009 period and the villages with no HTA. We find that targeted villages exhibit a
significantly higher average level of public goods over the 1987-2009 period than villages
with no HTA. This significant difference is observed for schools and health centers as well
as water amenities, the difference between treated and control localities in terms of water
infrastructures being mainly driven by the second period of analysis (1998-2009). These
results are robust to the introduction of time-varying variables in the estimations.
Overall, the empirical evidence presented in this paper shows that Malian villages
targeted by an HTA registered in France are significantly better endowed in terms of
local public goods than the others. Despite the large scale public investments in social
services implemented since the nineties, villages with no HTA did not manage to catch up
with those benefiting from these collective transfers. Our quantitative assessment of the
impact of Malian HTAs paves the way for further research to understand the channels
through which collective transfers affect local public good provision, and in particular
to identify the political economy mechanisms at play since HTAs are non-state agents
interfering in the process of public good provision.
The impact of HTAs may first be explained by the important ability of migrants to
collect funds (either because their private incomes are high enough to finance collective
project, or because they were able to mobilize French public funds through the so-called
co-development initiatives which expanded in the nineties, HTAs being one of the main
actors of these official development assistance projects). Second, the positive impact of
HTAs on public good provision may stem from higher effectiveness and better choices in
terms of local development. HTAs may notably contribute to improve local governance
by asking for more accountability of the local elite and transparency of public affairs,
thus reducing the capture of public funds.
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Finally, this paper opens the question of the impact of HTAs on intra-locality inequal-
ity. The presence of HTAs and their involvement in the provision of public goods may
exacerbate existing diverging interests, especially if the intended beneficiaries do not have
much voice in the selection and oversight of the funded development projects. Inversely,
HTAs may reduce the unequal access of public goods by financing investment in areas
lagging behind. All these research questions are over the scope of this paper and call for
innovative research frames.
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Annex A: Adding time-varying covariates - Detailed results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES SCHOOL WATER HH TAP HH WELL HH FOUNTAIN HH ELEC HEALTH
HTA 0.868** 1.024*** 0.0436*** -0.0781* 0.0905*** 0.00585 0.267***
(0.344) (0.374) (0.0164) (0.0430) (0.0218) (0.00777) (0.0602)
Population 0.209*** 0.0551 -0.00178 0.00196 -0.00114 0.000420 0.0416***
(in logarithm) (0.0528) (0.0474) (0.00264) (0.00695) (0.00273) (0.00171) (0.00940)
Ethno-linguistic -0.281*** -0.0893 0.00342 -0.105*** 0.00757 0.00928* 0.00130
fragmentation (0.104) (0.0935) (0.00624) (0.0229) (0.00970) (0.00477) (0.0253)
% of the labor force -0.110 -0.176*** -0.0135*** 0.0226 -0.00986 -0.00197 -0.0594***
in the primary sector (0.0733) (0.0600) (0.00501) (0.0142) (0.00678) (0.00295) (0.0179)
Annual rainfall average -0.00163* -0.000311 0.000137 0.000100 -0.000504*** 7.38e-05 0.000799**
over [t, t− 1] (0.000982) (0.00126) (0.000136) (0.000302) (0.000168) (5.44e-05) (0.000404)
Annual rainfall shock 0.00209 0.000825 -0.000115 -0.000301 0.000159 -6.98e-05 -0.000284
over [t, t− 1] (0.00201) (0.00123) (9.34e-05) (0.000273) (0.000127) (4.68e-05) (0.000420)
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune-level time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17,091 17,091 17,091 17,091 17,091 17,091 17,091
Nb of treated 1,165 1,165 1,165 1,165 1,165 1,165 1,165
Nb of controls 7,381 7,381 7,381 7,381 7,381 7,381 7,381
R-squared 0.412 0.238 0.179 0.215 0.269 0.164 0.356
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In all columns, the control group gathers the villages without HTA and the treated villages are those with an HTA (whatever its
date of creation).
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